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AI Safety & Trust and Safety

Prompt Injection Security Policy

Version:2.0
Effective:July 4, 2026
Updated:July 4, 2026
Review:January 4, 2027

Purpose

Defines controls to mitigate prompt injection risks, particularly in agentic systems like WSAI CODE.

Scope

All products processing untrusted external content within model context.

Definitions

Prompt Injection.

Policy Statements

Prescriptive Technical Mandates, replacing generic language Systems ingesting untrusted content must implement, at minimum: - Privilege separation: Untrusted content is never granted the same instruction-authority as system or user prompts; a formal instruction hierarchy (system > developer > user > tool/retrieved-content) is enforced at the model and application layer. - Output filtering: All agent outputs pass through an action-classifier before execution; outputs matching known injection patterns are blocked and logged. - Scoped, revocable permissions: Agents receive time-boxed, task-scoped credentials rather than standing access; permissions expire automatically at task completion. - Mandatory penetration testing: Every new tool integration undergoes dedicated prompt injection penetration testing before release, performed by a team independent of the feature's builders. - Cryptographically signed audit logs: All agent actions are logged in a hash-chained, tamper-evident log reviewable during incident investigation.

Responsibilities

Security and Research Engineering jointly own mitigation design; independent penetration testing team validates before release.

Compliance Requirements

Prompt injection test suites run against all agentic feature releases; audit log integrity verified quarterly.

Enforcement

Features failing injection resistance testing blocked from release.

Reporting Process

Exceptions Process

CISO + AI Safety Research Lead joint approval, time-limited to 30 days pending remediation.

Review Process

Quarterly.

Contact Information

End of document — Doc 19 · v2.0